We analyze polarization in India roughly in the past two and half decades using consumption expenditure data. We show that both bipolarization and multidimensional polarization (on several dimensions: caste, rural-urban, state, region) have increased since the 1990s. In the case of bipolarization, this is a reversal from the earlier trend (in the 1980s). Overall, our results suggest that the high growth that India has been witnessing since the 1990s has been associated with widening disparities. Comparing polarization and inequality, we find similarities, but also some differences. Our results therefore underscore the importance of studying polarization as distinct from traditional inequality.
4 with inequality in a traditional sense, and to the best of our knowledge no systematic study exists on polarization. Our paper therefore aims to fill this gap.
It is worthwhile to point out here that the study of inequality and polarization in the Indian context (as in many other contexts) is far from a purely intellectual exercise. India has been adopting a set of far-reaching pro-market policy reforms since the early 1990s (although there were antecedents for these policies in the 1980s). Considerable debate exists on how much one can credit these reforms for the growth that India has been experiencing, and on the other consequences of these reforms (e.g. poverty reduction). Inequality has emerged as a contentious issue in this and even different ways of thinking about inequality. 4 While we cannot resolve this debate by providing definitive answers, we do think that our focus on polarization may provide a different/newer perspective. Our study is related to (and in a sense, complements) the analysis in Vakulabharanam et al. (2010) , who use NSS data to map worsening class (based upon occupational categories) inequalities in India. It is also related to Sarkar and Mehta (2010) , who focus on wage inequality using NSS data. Neither of these studies deals with polarization or the comparison between inequality and polarization trends.
Whether growth in India is leading to significant poverty reduction and improvement in the material conditions of everyone is a moot point. But, even if this 5 is so, as some sociologists (Bourdieu 1999) have emphasized, an individual who occupies the lower rungs in any society (particularly one that is growing rapidly and accumulating wealth on a large scale) could experience "positional suffering," which to an outsider may appear "unreal." 5 We consider this to be important and part of our motivation for studying polarization in the Indian context derives from this.
Given the above, we use the Indian National Sample Survey (NSS) data on monthly consumption expenditure for the years 1983, 1993-94, and 2004-05, to investigate changes in polarization. A description of this data and our methodology is presented below, but at this juncture, it is worth pointing out that the choice of these years will allow us to map changes roughly a decade before and after the reforms and also allow us to contrast two high growth phases (in the 1980s and since the 1990s).
Also, 2004-05 is the latest survey that is available right now. A broad summary of our findings is as follows: we find that polarization has sharply increased in India since the early 1990s. When it comes to "unidimensional" polarization, this is a reversal from the previous trend (i.e. during 1983-94). Looking at multidimensional polarization, we show it this has increased on several fronts (caste, state, region) since the early 1990s. Except on the dimension of caste, this is not different from the trend during 1983-94 (when it was increasing too), but the increase during 1994-2005 has been sharper, i.e. at a more rapid pace. On the dimension of caste, a declining trend during 1983-94 was reversed during 1994-2005. Since causality is hard to establish, we would like to be cautious and argue that our results suggest that the Indian growth process has been associated with increasing disparities. We find some differences in polarization and inequality trends, so our belief is that there is merit in exploring polarization in various other contexts.
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The remaining part of the paper is organized into four sections. The next section presents a review of the literature on polarization. Section 3 presents a description of the data and the methodology that we follow. Section 4 presents our analysis and results. The final section concludes.
Literature Review
Excellent surveys of the literature on polarization are presented in Chakravarty (2009) and Esteban and Ray (2010) . In what follows below, we present a description of the basic ideas and a brief summary of some important studies. Our primary attempt is to facilitate the readers in understanding the analysis and inferences given in the remainder of the paper.
As mentioned above, in economics, a burgeoning literature on polarization has emerged in roughly the past two decades. There are broadly two different notions of polarization in this literature. The first, "bipolarization" is motivated by the idea that the presence of a sizeable middle class can mute (at least to a certain extent) conflict that could arise if the population were to be divided into masses of rich and poor. 6 The seminal studies here are Foster and Wolfson (1992) and Wolfson (1994) , although the idea that the middle class is a stabilizing force is a rather old one and can be traced back at least to Aristotle. In The Politics, Aristotle discusses the virtues of the middle class and how it can balance the vices of the two extreme classes (i.e. the rich and the poor). It is worthwhile to quote Aristotle at length since the polarization literature (to the best of our knowledge) has not discussed his insight, 7 which should be located within the context of ancient Greek city-states.
"It is clear then both that the political partnership which operates through the middle class is best, and also that those cities have every chance of being well-governed in which the middle class is large, stronger if possible than the other two together, or at any rate stronger than one of them. For the 7 addition of its weight to either side will turn the balance and prevent the extravagance of the opposition" (Aristotle 1962, pp. 172-173).
The conception of the process of polarization as one in which the middle diminishes in importance, breaking up the society into groups (poles) is also old.
Marx and Engels discuss the class that stands in the middle (i.e. between the proletariat and the capitalists, e.g. the petty bourgeoisie) and its fragility -given the likelihood that in the process of capitalist development, people belonging to this class could join the ranks of the proletariat:
"The lower strata of the middle class-the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and settled tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants-all these sink gradually into the proletariat, partly because their diminutive capital does not suffice for the scale on which Modern Industry is carried on, and is swamped in the competition with the large capitalists, partly because their specialized skill is rendered worthless by new methods of production" (Marx and Engels [1848] 1978, pp. 479-80).
They (and Marx separately) also discuss the process of polarization wherein capitalist society gets divided into two classes confronting each other -the capitalists and the workers. 8 Given the richness of Marx's insights and the multiple interpretations that one can drawn from his work, this maybe a simple description, 9 but it will suffice given our purpose, viz. showing that the idea of polarization had antecedents in classical thinking.
Foster and Wolfson (1992) and Wolfson (1994) demonstrate the main principles/axioms that characterize the process of polarization 10 and distinguish it from inequality (traditionally understood). These are "increasing spread" and 
Note that the above index is a "relative" index in that it satisfies the property of Scale Invariance, which says that scaling all incomes (or wealth, expenditure etc.) by a common positive factor leaves the index of polarization unchanged. An "absolute" counterpart of the above index can be constructed by multiplying it by the median.
This absolute index satisfies the property of Translation Invariance, which says that increasing or decreasing all the incomes (or wealth, expenditure etc.) by the same amount, leaves the index unchanged. 115-117), which is based upon the insight that polarization is concerned with deviations from the middle (i.e. median). The main idea is to aggregate these deviations to get a measure of polarization that satisfies some reasonable axioms.
These axioms are Normalization, Symmetry, Population Principle, Increased Spread, and Increased Bipolarity (the last two were discussed above). Normalization says that for a perfectly equal distribution, the index of polarization is zero. Symmetry is essentially anonymity, implying that only the incomes (or wealth, expenditure etc.,
and not the people who possess these) matter. Population principle guarantees that cloning the entire distribution does not matter for the index of polarization. Since it is a relative index, it also satisfies the property of Scale Invariance (discussed above).
Chakravarty (2009, p. 117) shows that such an index has the following form:
As earlier, m denotes the median, n is the size of the total population, and (x 1 , x 2 ,…, x n ) is the distribution. ε is a positive number between 0 and 1. Note that for ease of exposition, we have slightly simplified the index by assuming that all the income classes are singletons. For a given distribution, the higher the value of ε, the higher is the value of the index -this can be seen by differentiating the index with respect to ε.
ε is an inverse measure of the degree to which the index exhibits the increased bipolarity property -the lower the value of ε, the larger is the increase in the index due to a progressive transfer on either side of the median. This can be verified by making a transfer, and then differentiating the change in the index with respect to ε.
An absolute counterpart of this index can be obtained by multiplying by the median.
Given that there are several bipolarization indices, there is a possibility that these could disagree. Chakravarty (2009, pp. 117-121) has therefore suggested the ideas of "relative bipolarization dominance" and "relative bipolarization curve" similar to the ideas of Lorenz dominance and Lorenz curve, respectively from inequality measurement. The idea again is to look at the deviations from the median.
Formally, consider a distribution
.., x k ) in non-decreasing order with a median m. The relative bipolarization curve is given by:
kˆ is the index for the individual corresponding to the median. Note that on the horizontal axis, we have the poorest 1%, 2% etc. of the population: j (=1,2,…,k) is the index for an individual and so j/k is the rank of the individual in percentage terms.
The ordinate is the aggregate shortfall from a hypothetical distribution where 11 everyone has an income equal to the median, normalized by the total income in such a distribution. A distribution x is said to dominate another distribution y if the relative bipolarization curve of the former lies nowhere below (and above for at least one point) the same of the latter. In this case, it can be shown that x is characterized by higher polarization as compared to y according to all relative bipolarization indices satisfying Increased Spread, Increased Bipolarity, Symmetry and Population Principle. As in the case of Lorenz dominance, ambiguous rankings are possible due to crossings -in this case, while some indices could give one ranking, other indices would give a different ranking.
While we have been discussing bipolarization, a second view that one can discern in the literature, focuses on polarization in a more general sense -through an arbitrary number of groupings based upon income (or expenditure, wealth etc.). 13 This has also been referred to as the "identification-alienation" framework: individuals belonging to a particular group identify with one another and are alienated from those belonging to another group. Polarization is a group phenomenon 14 characterize the polarization as:
K>0 is a constant and ]
is a parameter that measures the polarization sensitivity of the index. From the structure of the index, the identification and alienation components are clear:
, respectively. It is also clear that the 12 higher the value of α, the larger the departure from inequality, which is why α can be interpreted as capturing polarization sensitivity (Note that if α=0, the index boils down to the Gini). Duclos et al. (2004) derive an analogue of the above index, which can be used to characterize polarization in the case of continuous distributions and which has the advantage of not assuming knowledge of any pre-existing income (or wealth, expenditure etc.) groups. This index is as given below:
Here f is the density function for income and ] 1 ,
is (as earlier) a parameter that captures the polarization sensitivity. With household survey data, f is approximated by a kernel density function.
One point to be noted here, which has not been sufficiently highlighted in the polarization literature, is the following. With bipolarization, we are concerned with the middle class -there is considerable amount of social theory that tries to understand the middle class and its relationship with other groups in the society, from various settings and from different perspectives. 15 We believe that people, in general, may have an intuitive understanding of the middle class and/or "the middle" in the societies in which they live. In contrast to this, when there are an arbitrary number of groups, the nature and relationship among these groups has been relatively underexplored in social theory. Moreover, although some notions for continuous distributions (e.g. squeeze) have been formalized and used in axiomatization, it is not clear how/how much they correspond with peoples' notions of polarization. These issues have to be kept in mind while interpreting this kind of polarization.
While the above studies look at polarization on one dimension (e.g. income, wealth), a related literature looks at "multidimensional polarization" -here the idea is 13 that there is more than one dimension at play, e.g. race and income; caste and expenditure. The particular form of multidimensional polarization that we are interested in, concerns a situation where groups are defined in terms of predetermined identities (caste, region etc.) and polarization is measured by looking at cohesion within a group and differences among groups. As explained in Esteban and
Ray (2010) and Chakravarty (2009), this is consistent with the "identificationalienation" framework that we discussed above.
A relevant multidimensional polarization index that we will use is due to by Esteban and Ray (2010), the implicit assumption here is that identification within and alienation among subgroups is based upon incomes -an assumption that may, or may not hold. Second, suppose that both the between and within components fall (or rise) by the same factor, polarization does not change -however, inequality has clearly changed (Jayadev and Reddy 2011). 16 
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Before concluding this section, we would like to add that in our reading, the literature on polarization is still unsettled and evolving -much still needs to be achieved in terms of clarifying concepts, axioms and measurement. However, we believe that there is "something out there" in the concept of polarization which cannot be captured by traditional inequality, and which the literature is trying to discover and conceptualize. Our paper partly attempts to throw light on this by focusing on the Indian context.
Also, while the axiomatic approach has its strengths, axioms in social sciences are many times not taken literally as axioms, but rather as assumptions about the real world. 17 Given this, the following questions (which are also relevant in the context of inequality measurement) arise: are the axioms of polarization "realistic"? Do they correspond with subjective notions that individuals or groups hold? In our opinion, more work needs to be done to clarify this although Foster and Wolfson (1992) and
Wolfson (1994) present some evidence (based upon Amiel and Cowell (1992)) to argue that people do hold beliefs that justify the use of the notion of bipolarization.
Moreover, if axioms are treated as "desirable properties," then it is not entirely clear whether it is unproblematic to take certain axioms used in inequality measurement (e.g. anonymity, replication invariance) and use these in the context of polarization, particularly if criticisms have been raised about them in the context of inequality measurement. 18 This is another issue on which more work needs to be done. These caveats (or rather limitations of the polarization literature) have to be kept in mind while interpreting the analysis and results below.
Description of the Data and Methodology
The data that we use is from the Indian National Sample Surveys (NSS) on household consumption expenditure for the years 1983 (38 th round), 1993-94 (50 th round) and 2004-05 (61 st round). As mentioned above, the choice of these years will allow us to map changes roughly a decade before and after the reforms, and allows us to contrast two high growth phases -in the 1980s and since the 1990s. 19 The data from these rounds is comparable, and we therefore do not need to worry about the incomparability issue that had plagued some earlier studies -essentially due to differences in survey methodology, data from the 55 th round ( Moreover, to the extent that we would like to compare trends in inequality to those of polarization, the nominal-real distinction is not important. Finally, in making inter-personal or inter-group comparisons (which is at the heart of polarization), we believe that there may be an equally valid case for using nominal values. 24 and all-India levels, polarization and inequality display similarities, but also differences. We will discuss this issue and its implications in greater detail below.
Analysis and Results

Insert Table 1 here
It is also worthwhile to investigate increases in polarization further, to see what is driving the changes in polarization. For this purpose, we will look at the (landless) or small farmers (less than 2 hectares). When we focus on urban areas, the poorer half largely comprises of (about 65%) SCs and OBCs 26 and those in lowskilled/low-paying occupations, with those involved in "elementary occupations" (e.g. street vendors, garbage collectors, domestic helpers) being the highest (28%), followed by clerks (19%) and plant and machine operators and assemblers (10%). 27 As discussed in Section 2 (literature review), there seems to be no consensus on the right index to measure bipolarization -there are several indices that are possible. We therefore construct the Relative Bipolarization (RB) curve that we have discussed earlier for each of the three periods. The data used to construct the curves are shown Table 2 we have found -we discuss reasons for this in the concluding section.
Insert Table 2 and Figure 1 here
As discussed above, at the all-India level, the trends in polarization are similar to those of inequality, although there are some differences. To shed further light on this, we take a disaggregated view. Table 3 The time trends for Gini and Wolfson index are also different for some states, e.g. Jammu and Kashmir, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh.
Insert Table 3 here
An interesting issue that we can explore is the relationship between growth and polarization. In figure 2, we present a scatter plot of the growth rates in various states (in terms of real per-capita Net State Domestic Product) and the rate of change in polarization. This data is also presented in table 3 -the correlation coefficient between these two rates is 0.29. As we can observe, there is a modest, but positive relationship -states that have higher growth rates have also experienced higher 21 increases in polarization. This is some evidence that the growth process in India has gone along with increased polarization, although we would advise caution in interpreting this as a causal linkage. When we do a similar exercise with inequality (i.e. Gini), the results are similar in the sense that growth is associated with increased inequality, but the correlation is stronger (0.32).
Insert Figure 2 here
The literature on inequality in India has not really explored the case of absolute inequality, except in the case of wealth (Jayadev et al. 2007a ), so we do not want to say much about it (and hence do not report our computations in Table 1 ).
When we compare the changes in absolute inequality (as measured by the absolute The index is given in Table 1 for rural, urban and all-India levels for the three periods.
Although there are minor differences, the broad picture that we get is similar to that from bipolarization indices -essentially, polarization was stable during 1983-93, but rose sharply during 1994-2005. Given the possibility of several indices, the issues that one has to confront when we move to an arbitrary number of groups (which we discussed earlier, in the literature survey) and the sharp and unambiguous result that we have obtained from bipolarization, we are much more comfortable with our results
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on bipolarization. However, we reiterate that the trends from both notions of polarization are roughly similar.
Coming now to multi-dimensional polarization, there are several cleavages in the Indian society (like in many other societies) and therefore there are several dimensions on which disparities could manifest themselves. We have analyzed some of these dimensions and the results are reported in Table 4 .
Insert Table 4 here
One dimension that would naturally occur to any observer of India is caste.
Caste is of course a complex phenomenon that continues to attract tremendous amount of interest among various social scientists even today. 28 The NSS data allows us to do very little justice to this complex notion. Having said this, we can definitely We have recalculated the polarization index, by combining the OBCs with the others and this is also reported in Table 4 using the log mean deviation (Theil). It may not be a coincidence that among the various cleavages that we examine, the rural-urban one is characterized by the most polarization. Given the substantial amount of evidence that has accumulated, we believe that rural-urban disparity is the starkest among the various disparities that exist in India today.
Given the concern expressed among both academics and policymakers that disparities among various geographical regions are increasing and that some states are being left behind (e.g. Dreze and Sen 2002), we examine polarization among various Indian states. As we can observe, the polarization has been increasing steadily since the 1980s. We also divided the country into five regions (North, East, West, South and North East) and looked at changes in polarization. As we can observe, there has been a steady increase in polarization since the 1980s. The idea that is really driving this concern for regional disparity is that those states that are already relatively poor would see their position worsening. In India, much literature exists on the so-called BIMARU states (Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh), which have been found to lag behind other states on several development indicators. We therefore explored the polarization between the BIMARU states and other states. As we can observe, this has been increasing since the 1980s. However, the period 1983-93 has seen a slight increase, whereas the period 1994-2005 has seen a much sharper increase.
Discussion and Conclusions
There are two audiences that this paper has been addressed to. First is the audience that is interested in the Indian growth process -has this process been inclusive, or has it worsened pre-existing cleavages? Our main message to this audience is that the growth process in India since the 1990s has been associated with an increase in polarization. This is true whether we are looking at bipolarization, or polarization with an arbitrary number of groups, or at polarization in a multidimensional sense -on the lines of caste, sector (rural-urban), state or region.
Since the inequality trends are broadly similar at the all-India level (more on the comparison between inequality and polarization below), we believe that this says something about this growth process -irrespective of the different measures and different concepts/axioms that one is using, as long as one focuses on consumption expenditure (which is widely used, including as a proxy for income), one finds that the growth process has been associated with widening disparities. Also, given the limitations of data (undersampling, underreporting etc., that we discussed earlier) the degree of polarization that we find is in all likelihood an underestimate. Moreover, the increases in polarization are also likely to be larger than what we have found, given that opportunities for wealth/income accumulation are much higher in 2004-5. 29 Given that the idea of polarization is motivated by its connection with conflict, should we be concerned about the existing level of conflict in India, and that conflict would increase in the future? How do we link the evidence on polarization in India to potential conflict, or measures of conflict, or actual instances of conflict? These are difficult questions to answer, and are beyond the scope of this paper -much more research needs to be done on this front, including conceptualization and measurement of the extent of conflict. There are many sources of conflict in India (e.g.
income/wealth, caste, region, religion etc.) and these may interact with one another in a complex manner. So, we can only offer sketchy and speculative remarks. Having said this, we would like to point out that anecdotal evidence exists to suggest high and increasing level of conflict on the geographical/spatial dimension -among regions within a state, between richer and poorer states and between rural-urban areas. In a way, our findings on multidimensional polarization are consistent with this. 30 Sharp increases in bipolarization in certain states that have witnessed enormous violence and conflict (e.g. Gujarat, which in 2002, saw one of the worst instances of religious conflict in post-independence India) are also unsurprising from this perspective. It is also possible that the extent and patterns of accumulation and consumption 31 by the Indian elite may contribute to tensions in the future. 32 The second audience that this paper is addressed to is one that is interested in polarization and inequality. We have presented patterns of polarization from a concrete and interesting context. In comparing polarization and inequality, we have found mixed results -while the trends at an all-India level are similar for inequality and polarization, the magnitudes of changes and the disaggregated trends are different between these two. The linkages to growth are also different. Overall, we believe that our results highlight the importance of studying polarization and the need for more empirical studies that will help tease out how inequality and polarization play out in particular contexts. The Big Economic Story of our times is that the Chinese in 1978 and then the Indians in 1991 adopted liberal ideas in the economy, and came to attribute a dignity and a liberty to the bourgeoisie formerly denied. And then China and India exploded in economic growth."
